



## Early Journal Content on JSTOR, Free to Anyone in the World

This article is one of nearly 500,000 scholarly works digitized and made freely available to everyone in the world by JSTOR.

Known as the Early Journal Content, this set of works include research articles, news, letters, and other writings published in more than 200 of the oldest leading academic journals. The works date from the mid-seventeenth to the early twentieth centuries.

We encourage people to read and share the Early Journal Content openly and to tell others that this resource exists. People may post this content online or redistribute in any way for non-commercial purposes.

Read more about Early Journal Content at <http://about.jstor.org/participate-jstor/individuals/early-journal-content>.

JSTOR is a digital library of academic journals, books, and primary source objects. JSTOR helps people discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content through a powerful research and teaching platform, and preserves this content for future generations. JSTOR is part of ITHAKA, a not-for-profit organization that also includes Ithaka S+R and Portico. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [support@jstor.org](mailto:support@jstor.org).

## ON A USE OF ΔΟΚΩ

BY A. T. MURRAY

It is the purpose of this paper to examine the rather scanty evidence for *δοκῶ* in the sense of "*think right*," which, however, seems to be demanded in certain passages. I cite the following:

Soph. *Antig.* 1101: καὶ ταῦτ' ἐπαινεῖς, καὶ δοκεῖς παρειαθεῖν;

This line has puzzled commentators, and no unanimity has as yet been reached regarding its interpretation. In the Schneidewin-Nauck edition it is called "unverständlich" (Nauck has suggested λέγεις or με λῆς as a substitute for δοκεῖς). Musgrave, who is followed in the Wolff-Bellerman edition, connected the infin. παρειαθεῖν with ἐπαινεῖς, and translated, "et haec suades concedere et censēs?" or "Rätst du an und glaubst es auch (dasz ich es thun werde)?"

Wecklein follows Rauchenstein in reading δοκεῖ, and Jebb, apparently independently, has made the same change. Jebb defends the omission of the pronoun σοι by *Ph.* 526 and 645 and by Aesch. *Theb.* 650: σὺ δ' αὐτὸς ἤδη γνῶθι τίνα πέμπειν δοκεῖ, where the inferior MSS have δοκεῖς (which would make that line very similar to the one under consideration). Jebb assumes that the copyists felt that the use of the impers. δοκεῖ without a dat. was strange, and hence changed the form of the verb. He continues, "The decisive objection to δοκεῖς here is that it could only mean, 'art thou minded to yield?' (Aesch. *Ag.* 16 ὅταν δ' αἰεῖδεν ἢ μινύρῃσθαι δοκῶ); not 'dost thou think it right that I should yield?'"

Kayser was apparently the first to give this interpretation (that δοκεῖς = *probas*), and it is accepted in the editions of Tournier-Desrousseaux and of Humphreys. The latter scholar is the only one, so far as I know, who defends this view at any length. He postulates that "just as δοκεῖ may mean either *it seems* or *it seems best*, so, there is reason to believe, δοκῶ may mean either *I think* or *I think (it) best* or *proper*." In support of this he cites *Ag.* 16 (see above) and Ar. *Nub.* 1415, which I shall presently discuss. To

Humphreys the only difficulty in the line before us is the omission of the subj. of the infin., although it is not the same as that of *δοκεῖς*. He explains this by assuming that Creon consults the Coryphaeus as his official adviser, so that there is no impropriety in his saying, "Dost thou think it best to yield?" He further calls attention to the fact that, even if we emend to *δοκεῖ*, the difficulty regarding the omitted pronoun remains; and finally concludes, "That another example should be found cannot be demanded, as the instances of *δοκῶ* in this sense are so rare."

It is to be noted that even on Jebb's assumption that the text of the line before us was changed from *δοκεῖ* to *δοκεῖς* by copyists—as was the text of Aesch. *Theb.* 650, cited above—it still remains true that the meaning thus given to *δοκῶ* seemed to the writers a natural one. At least the assumption of this meaning seemed to them easier than the omission of the pronoun with the imper. *δοκεῖ*. We shall see this fact even more strikingly illustrated in the passage next to be considered; and it is well, perhaps, to ask ourselves if the despised copyists may not after all have had a native instinct for the meanings and uses of words.

Jebb's objection that with the reading *δοκεῖς* the line can only mean "Art thou minded to yield?" has been fairly met by Humphreys. It surely does not strain the words to render, "Dost thou think it best to yield?" and we need not claim that *με* is omitted.

In Ar. *Nub.* 1415: *κλάουσι παῖδες, πατέρα δ' οὐ κλάειν δοκεῖς*; parodied from Eur. *Alc.* 691: *χαίρεις ὀρῶν φῶς, πατέρα δ' οὐ χαίρειν δοκεῖς*, we are at once struck by the fact that while in the original passage *δοκεῖς* means merely "*think*," in the line of Ar. it must mean *think right*, or *proper*. The line simply makes no sense without this idea of fitness or obligation. Now, the line is a trimeter, occurring in the midst of a series of tetrameters—a fact expressly recognized and stated in the scholia. We have no exact parallel to this (although Gratinus 199K shows a similar sudden shift in meter); but the fact is at once explained and justified by the parody. It is not strange, however, that many suggestions have been made for filling out the line by adding the supposedly missing syllables. The inferior MSS add *τλή δῆ* (the line is given as a trimeter in both R and V); Cobet suggested *σὺ χρῆναι*; Herwerden,

*προσήκειν*; Schneider, *δικαίως*; Blaydes, *τι χρῆναι* (though he ejects the line altogether); while Hermann and Meineke mark a lacuna. Van Leeuwen accepts the reading of the inferior MSS, but adds, "Fortasse igitur interpolatoris hoc est lacunam de suo explentis. . . . mallet *οὐ κλάειν δίκαιον ἡγεί* vel *οὐ κλάειν δοκεῖ δίκαιον*, si veri simile ducerem comicum tragicum verba ita refinxisse."

Here we note that while the ancient interpolators were struck only by the metrical solecism and felt no difficulty about the meaning of *δοκεῖς*, the moderns all desiderate some word of fitness or obligation.

No one who has studied parody can for a moment regard van Leeuwen's suggested readings as worthy of consideration; but at the same time it may perhaps, though I think without justice, be claimed that the mere fact that the line is a parody robs it of any value as establishing the meaning postulated for *δοκῶ*—on the ground that, had it not been for the limitations imposed by the line he was parodying, Ar. would never have used *δοκεῖς* as he did.

Aesch. *Ag.* 1649: *ἀλλ' ἐπεὶ δοκεῖς τάδ' ἔρδειν καὶ λέγειν, γνώσῃ τάχα.*

So all MSS, and the meaning is clear and appropriate—granting the use of *δοκῶ* which is under discussion—although Keck says of the traditional text, "Das ist allerding's unverständlich," and although various alterations have been suggested to make it possible to translate *δοκεῖς* "seem." It must surely be rendered "art minded."

Soph. *O.R.* 484: *δεινὰ μὲν οὖν δεινὰ παράσσει σοφὸς οἰωνοθέτας  
οὔτε δοκοῦντ' οὔτ' ἀποφάσκονθ', ὅ, τι λέξω δ' ἀπορῶ.*

It will be seen at a glance that grammatically two constructions are possible for the participles: they may be acc. neut. pl. or acc. masc. sing. If the former, they agree with an inner, if the latter, with the outer object of *παράσσει* (*με*, understood). The Schol. apparently chose the former alternative, for he gives as the meaning *οὔτε πιστὰ οὔτε ἄπιστα*. Similarly Triclinius gives as an interpretation of *ἀποφάσκοντα*, *ἀπόφασιν καὶ ἀπιστίαν δεχόμενα*.

Hermann, whose note is cited in Ebeling, has the following: "Cum aut credibilia atque incredibilia, aut affirmantia et negantia inter se opponi debuerint, ex utroque genere aliquid sumpsit, *δοκοῦντα*, quae crederentur, et *ἀποφάσκοντα* quae negarent." This,

I take it, he regarded as an instance of Sophocles' masterful subtlety in language. To me it would be merely a bit of slovenly writing.

The note in the Wunder-Wecklein edition reads the meaning of the German translation into the Greek: "Similiter nos possumus dicere, 'weder ansprechendes noch absprechendes,' i.e., neque probabilia neque improbabilia." Similarly Schmelzer renders, "An sich unglaublich, und doch auch wieder nicht durchaus zurückzuweisen." Both these last-mentioned renderings postulate for *ἀποφάσκοντα* in the neut. pl. a meaning it can only have if it be given a personal subj.—i.e., if in the present passage it be taken as acc. masc. sing.

Nauck, in his revision of Schneidewin's edition, gives the passage up as corrupt, "wie *δοκεῖν* und *ἀποφάσκειν* keinen richtigen Gegensatz bilden"; and the note in the Wolff-Bellermann edition is to the same effect, "Neque affirmantem neque negantem (Hermann-Nauck) können die Worte nicht bedeuten, da *δοκῶ* zwar heisst, *ich meine*, aber nicht, *ich finde glaublich*."

Blaydes, in his commentary, renders as neut. pl., and following the scholiast: "Things neither probable (as said to have been committed by Oedipus) nor improbable (as uttered by the seer)"; but at the same time he recognizes that this translation strains the Greek. *δοκοῦντα* (used absolutely) may well mean "things credible"; but *ἀποφάσκοντα* can by no possibility mean "things incredible." Blaydes therefore thinks of emending to *ἀπαρέσκοντα*. He adds, however, "But if *ἀποφάσκοντα* (i.e., denying; refusing to believe) be correct, we must, in order to produce harmony in the sense, render *δοκοῦντα* rather 'deeming probable' (from *δοκῶ*, not *δοκεῖ*) (Kayser, 'vates me conturbat neque probantem neque audentem negare'). But is *δοκεῖν* ever thus used?" (Earle meets this difficulty by rendering *δοκοῦντα* "believing.")

I cite Blaydes's note in full because it illustrates his tendency to emend rashly, and at the same time his sure instinct for the language.

The view last propounded (that *δοκοῦντα* = *probantem*) is, I think, plainly right. It is the only one that gives the passage a meaning, and it exactly suits the context. I would call attention to the fact that the following clause strongly supports the view that the two partic. are acc. sing., agreeing with *με* understood.

This interpretation is given, virtually without comment, by Campbell, and also by Jebb. The latter defends it at some length. *δοκοῦντα*, he says, is not "believing," but "approving"; and he cites in support of this meaning the line from *Antigone*, which, however, he declares in his commentary on *Antigone* to be impossible Greek. He adds the very sane comment, "The pregnant force of *δοκοῦντα* is here brought out by the direct contrast with *ἀποφάσκοντα*. In gauging the rarer uses of words by an artist in language so subtle and so bold as Sophocles, we must never neglect the context."

Certain other passages suggest themselves as lending support to the view above set forth. In these *δοκῶ* is used personally but has generally the dat. pron. Aesch. *Ag.* 16 has already been referred to. The reading *δοκῶ* is accepted without question (Blaydes alone "emends") and the meaning "whenever I am minded to sing" seems to disturb no one. Yet that meaning stands nearer to "think best" than to "think"; and scholars have objected to other passages in which the traditional text admits or demands the same interpretation.

The "law" is regarded as established that *δοκῶ μοι* expressing intention may take only fut. infin. or aor. infin. with *ἄν* (see Mein. *Vind Ar.* 67; Sobolewski, *Synt.* 26; Cobet, *N.L.* 245), and is plainly stated in Starkie's note on *Vesp.* 250 (see the array of passages cited by Blaydes on *Acharn.* 994). Many passages which seem to offend against it have been emended, and rightly emended. Often the easy change from aor. to fut. or the insertion of *ἄν* suffices; and in some passages the substitution of a form of the impersonal *δοκεῖ* seems necessary.

I venture, however, to suggest that in some cases it may be worth considering whether the MSS reading should not be kept and defended on the ground that the phrase means, not "think I shall" or "think I could (should)," but merely "have a mind to"; in which sense neither fut. nor *ἄν* is needed. Naturally this is a matter of subjective opinion, and often the same passage makes good sense interpreted in either way. We need not claim that *Vesp.* 177, *τὸν ὄνον ἐξάγειν δοκῶ*, is correct, and should be rendered "I've a notion to bring out the donkey," for the easy emendation to *ἐξάξειν*

seems a real improvement; (so, too, in Plat. *Phaedr.* 230E); nor need we defend *Eq.* 1311 f.:

ἦν δ' ἀρέσκη ταῦτ' Ἀθηνάιοις, καθῆσθαί μοι δοκῶ  
 ἐς τὸ Θησεῖον πλεύσας ἢ 'ς τὸ τῶν σεμνῶν θεῶν,

for there the change to *δοκεῖ* seems well-grounded; but surely in *Av.* 671: ἐγὼ μὲν αὐτὴν καὶ φιλήσαί μοι δοκῶ, the text as it stands, meaning, "I've a notion e'en to kiss her," is better than when changed to *καὶ φιλῆσαι* or to *καὶ φιλήσειν*; and Ar. *Plut.* 1186 f. may be similarly interpreted.

STANFORD UNIVERSITY, CAL.  
 January, 1910